

THE STRUCTURAL BLIND SPOT

*Institutional Conflict of Interest and Individual Responsibility:
Causes of the Systematic Absence of Scientific Literature
on a Matter of Primary Democratic and Juridical Relevance.*

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Abstract

The present work formulates and argues a specific scientific anomaly: the substantial absence, in the international academic literature, of critical analyses on the duration of appointments within the structure of public employment as a primary democratic variable. The analysis shows that this absence is neither casual nor due to the irrelevance of the problem, but constitutes the predictable consequence of two converging mechanisms: a structural conflict of interest, which enacts a selection process and career-advancement mechanisms for public personnel oriented toward closed conformity rather than toward an engaged civic and democratic sensibility, and which continuously shapes the research agenda; and an individual awareness that cannot be entirely nullified by the structure, thereby founding a personal responsibility alongside the systemic one. The advent of synthetic intelligence today makes plausible the dismissal of much of the personnel in public functions, including academic ones. The interpretive scheme of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers an ethical and democratic justification, historically coherent, for governing this transition legitimately. The whole converges toward new measurement instruments — the Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Social Harmony Index — and toward the design of the operational body of the Public Jobs Bank, developed by the Author within the framework of the Eudemonia Laboratory's activity spanning more than thirty years.

1. Introduction: An Absence That Demands Explanation

There is a structural feature that characterizes almost all contemporary societies we call democratic: the de facto irremovability of personnel in non-legislative public functions. Administrative employees, healthcare workers, university lecturers, judges, tax officials — the operational mass of the public structure, from the first to the last employee — occupy their positions without any effective time limit, with no democratic majority able to remove them, with no citizen able to aspire to replace them for as long as they are alive and in service. Yet this feature is not marginal, because it is precisely these roles that exercise real power, control collective resources, and shape the next generations.

An observer external to scientific circles would expect this variable — the temporal structure of public employment — to be the object of broad, rigorous and continuous comparative research. In the eighty years since the postwar democratic reconstruction, one would expect studies comparing systems with different degrees of institutional rotation, studies relating the temporariness of legislative roles to the irremovability of functional roles, theories analyzing the effects of the temporal monopoly of public careers as a form of systematic exclusion and therefore its structural incompatibility with democratic participation. Literature exists on adjacent phenomena — bureaucratic politicization, institutional corruption, the accountability of the public official, the relationship between career structure and organizational performance — but no line of research specifically identifies the irremovability of public-employment roles as a primary variable in the founding of a democracy, relating it directly to the exclusionary effects it produces, the consequent inefficiency of the system, and the general distrust in institutions.

The great archives of the world's academic output, accessible today to everyone, show that the temporal structure of public apparatuses has been surrounded by research without ever being at its center. The correct scientific question is not whether the topic is irrelevant: it is why no systematic research has ever been produced on it. The answer, as will be argued, is structurally predictable and, at a further level, individually accountable.

2. Two Converging Mechanisms

2.1 The structural conflict of interest

Access systems to public functions, in their currently prevailing form, do not directly assess civic sensibility, capacity for autonomous judgment, or vocation for collective service. They chiefly measure knowledge of procedures, the ability to reproduce the knowledge required by selection tests, and suitability for fitting within a predefined regulatory framework. The result is a selection that favors cognitive and motivational profiles most compatible with the continuity of the existing system, and aimed at securing within it a stable and permanent position.

This is not a generic moral judgment: it is a verifiable structural prediction. A system that rewards conformity tends, over time, to produce an institutional population that values hierarchy, the stability of its own position, and vertical dependence — exactly the psychological profile functional to the perpetuation of a closed system. And since this selection does not occur only at entry but repeats throughout the entire career, through advancement mechanisms that reward those who do not question the structure, the result over time is a progressive convergence toward homogenization: the system becomes ever more similar to itself, ever less able to tolerate within it those who observe it critically.

To this is added a further phenomenon: artificial complexity as an instrument of power. A permanent bureaucratic system has a structural incentive to produce opacity — to make its functions appear inexecutable by anyone who has not spent decades within it. If the system is comprehensible, anyone can enter and replace whoever occupies it. If it is made opaque, irremovability becomes a functional necessity in everyone's eyes, including those of elected officials. This is why bureaucratic reforms almost always produce more bureaucracy, not less: whoever designs them is internal to the system and has every interest in reforming without simplifying.

The goal of a healthy society is the opposite: to keep functions and the system as a whole at a level of broad accessibility, one that does not annihilate common sense nor step outside the field of natural comprehensibility. Precisely because this is an eminently humanistic domain — not nuclear engineering but the management of the common good — it is possible and necessary that anyone possessing the requirements necessary for the role and its level be able to enter a public function, replace whoever is missing for any reason, and not degrade but rather constantly improve the final product. A system that requires decades of apprenticeship to perform ordinary functions of public service is by definition a system that has produced artificial complexity to protect occupied positions.

Let us also consider the domain of research. Standard economic theory predicts that rational agents will not produce information that damages their own material interests if they can avoid doing so without sanction. This principle is systematically accepted in the evaluation of research funded by the pharmaceutical, petroleum, and tobacco industries. In those cases, the scientific community recognizes without difficulty that the funder shapes the research agenda.

The same principle cannot but apply, with equal logical rigor, to academic research on public employment. The university researcher is, in almost all countries that call themselves democratic, a permanent public employee or a precarious worker aspiring to become one. Their salary, their career progression, their pension depend on the permanence of the public-employment system, with no time limit other than the arrival of the end of their working life. Producing research that demonstrates the structural dysfunction of that system would amount to producing research against one's own primary economic interest.

The resulting prediction is formally simple and falsifiable:

P₁: In a system in which researchers are permanent public employees, critical research on the permanent structure of public employment will be systematically underrepresented relative to its social relevance.

This prediction is falsifiable: it is enough to demonstrate the existence of a systematic, cumulative and dominant literature on this topic to refute it. As will emerge in the following section, such a demonstration is not available.

Institutional incentives shape the research agenda without any single agent having to make explicitly dishonest choices. A researcher considering working on the structural reform of public employment faces: funding difficulties, editorial resistance from reviewers with the same interests, reputational risk, and the absence of a reference community that accumulates results. That line of research is not explored not because anyone forbids it, but because the incentive system makes it rationally inconvenient for anyone operating within it. This mechanism has a precise name: cognitive capture. The institution that ought to be examined by research ends up conditioning research itself.

2.2 Individual responsibility: beyond structural determinism

The second element of the analysis is the most delicate to formulate with precision, but it is what makes the analysis complete and juridically relevant. The purely structuralist version of the argument — the system produces incentives that shape behavior without anyone having to consciously choose to do wrong — has real explanatory force, but has a serious flaw: it completely exempts individuals from responsibility. A legal, political and moral system cannot function without individual responsibility. If everything is structure, no one is ever guilty of anything.

It is therefore necessary to affirm, with equal rigor, that the structure reduces the psychological cost of certain behaviors but does not nullify the awareness that accompanies them. An adult human being — and all the more so one who has made critical knowledge their profession — knows what they are doing when they occupy for life a position that, by popular sovereignty, belongs to the collectivity and ought to be made accessible to it. They know that they are excluding others. They know that elected governments depend on them, and not the reverse. They know that the power they exercise has not been legitimized by any democratic mandate.

The structure explains the diffusion of the phenomenon. Individual awareness — the deeper, the higher the education of the one who possesses it — founds the responsibility of those who take part in it. These are two distinct levels that must coexist, kept separate yet balanced, within the analysis. One cannot absolve everyone in the name of the system, nor condemn everyone indiscriminately while ignoring the real pressures the system exerts. Neither position alone is scientifically or ethically sustainable, and both interpretive paths must be pursued fully, balanced against each other.

Thirty years of direct communication — digital publications, messages, petitions addressed to scientists, researchers, professors, politicians, institutions, officials, letters clearly setting out this problem and its solutions — have never received a refutation on the merits. More significant still: in none of these cases has there been any response at all. The systematic silence of those who would have the means to refute, and do not do so, is itself an empirical datum: it is compatible with the scenario in which the problem is perceived, its relevance is recognizable, and the choice not to address it is conscious. It cannot be merely a matter of structural ignorance, but also of choice. The difference is not irrelevant, either morally or juridically.

3. The Evidence of the Absence: Verification

3.1 What exists and what is missing

The literature has produced significant work on adjacent topics. The study of institutional mechanisms has analyzed how to build incentive systems that orient behavior toward collective goals. Contract theory has examined the relationship between whoever delegates a function and whoever exercises it in the public sector. Studies on extractive institutions have documented how ruling classes perpetuate their dominance through rules built to their own advantage. Commons theory has analyzed how communities collectively manage what belongs to everyone.

What is systematically missing is the convergence of these strands toward the specific variable: the temporal structure of employment in non-legislative public functions as a primary determinant of democratic quality, social cohesion, and institutional efficiency. No one has built a model explicitly linking lifelong permanence in public employment to: the systematic exclusion of citizens from the *res publica*; the *de facto* privatization of collective functions; the progressive erosion of the resilience that would be typical of a democracy in which diverse individuals succeed one another, enriching the system's capabilities. What emerges is a systemic dysfunction that goes beyond ordinary inefficiency: a system structured to perpetuate itself progressively loses the capacity to face its problems, because solving them would entail introducing changes that would call the system itself into question.

It should be noted that countries with apparently more functional bureaucracies do not refute this thesis. Where institutional outcomes are better, they derive from more developed civic cultures, from traditions of collective participation, from balances of power maintained over time — not from bureaucratic stability itself, which in such cases is rather a consequence of those conditions, not their cause. Mistaking the effect for the cause is the error this objection commits.

3.2 The significance of the absence

In the philosophy of science, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But the systematic absence of research on a problem of primary objective relevance is itself a datum requiring explanation. The problem of the temporal structure of public employment is not obscure, technical, or hard to access. It is visible to anyone who

observes institutions. It is measurable. It is comparable across different systems. It has direct and documentable consequences for collective and individual well-being — as much for those left excluded as, not infrequently, even for those who do the excluding.

The null hypothesis — that the absence of research simply reflects the irrelevance of the problem — is falsified by direct evidence: the institutional dysfunctions this structure produces (endogenous corruption, waste of collective resources, erosion of trust in institutions, inability to respond to real needs with appropriate solutions) are widely documented as serious problems. The literature documents the effects without ever analyzing this structural cause. This is no accident: it is the blind spot in full operation.

4. The Consequences of the Blind Spot

4.1 Incomplete democracy

The twentieth century's transitions toward democracy introduced or confirmed the temporary mandate in only one segment of public functions: the legislative. Parliament renews itself. Everything else — administration, the judiciary, education, healthcare, the tax system, and so on — has remained structured according to the opposite principle: permanent occupation.

This asymmetry produces a precise structural consequence: the temporary, renewable part exercises nominal functions, while the permanent, irremovable part exercises substantive ones. Whoever controls education, public information, the tax system, the judiciary, and everything else is not subject to electoral mandate. They do not answer to the electorate. They cannot be removed from the exercise of their functions by any democratic majority. Elected governments do not understand the complexities artificially produced by the bureaucratic structure; they find themselves in fact dependent on it and unable to extend their gaze beyond the limits it imposes — reversing the relationship that democracy presupposes. Even where legislative functions appear independent, in reality they are not. The entire "public" system is closed in on itself by the absence of regular renewal of its functional personnel.

The formally proclaimed "democracy" is therefore structurally incomplete: the principle of the temporary mandate — which is the true substance of democracy, not the vote, which is its direct consequence, a fact as evident as it is globally overlooked — has never been extended to the whole of the public sphere. What exists today is not democracy realized: it is forms of elective monarchy/oligarchy, with a largely symbolic apex, limited in its own action, periodically replaced, while the operational body of the apparatuses remains unchanged.

4.2 Structural privatization of the public function

Every public role occupied for an indefinite period ceases to be a collective resource and becomes de facto private property. Every citizen with equivalent or superior

competences is structurally excluded from exercising that function for the entire working life of its holder. This exclusion is not an accidental consequence of the system: it is the constitutive characteristic of those apparatuses that predate the advent of democracy and that have never been made to change. The result is that the holder of that function exercises it not so much for the sake of collective interest as for the sake of their own permanence.

In the absence of an osmotic process — of a structured, periodic flow of new people into public functions — the Republic, a collective patrimony of goods and resources, of codes and laws, of employments and powers, the dynamic fulcrum of democracy, loses the character that distinguishes it from static structures of power. The indefinite contract in public employment is not a democratic achievement: it is the survival of a pre-existing custom that should have fallen at the very moment sovereignty passed to the people and the perpetual, irremovable figure of the monarch gave way to the temporary, mobile figure of the democrat.

4.3 Systemic fragility and loss of adaptability

A rigid institutional system — in which the same people occupy "public" functions for decades — progressively loses the capacity to respond to the growing complexity of the external environment. The competences of a function's holder age. Procedures crystallize. The capacity to work through new problems decreases while the complexity of problems increases. The systemic response to this deficit is not reform, but the growing extraction of resources to keep an inefficient structure alive: increased fiscal pressure, bureaucratic proliferation, reduction of real services.

The cybernetic law of requisite variety provides the formal framework: a regulating system must possess at least as much internal variety as the system it regulates. An institution whose personnel does not renew itself accumulates a variety deficit that, beyond a critical threshold, makes the system fragile in the face of exogenous shocks and unable to seize the opportunities that change produces. Coercion within a closed system, however well disguised, blocks the seizing of opportunities and fails to avert problems. Nature itself — in biological organisms as in social ones — has selected periodic turnover as a mechanism of survival and adaptation, not permanence.

5. The Moment of Transition: Synthetic Intelligence and Historic Opportunity

The question of how to concretely initiate the process of change admits no single answer. It does, however, require correcting a conclusion that a superficial analysis might suggest: that countries with consolidated bureaucratic structures cannot initiate change. It is exactly the opposite.

Countries with formalized "democracies" — Italy, France, Germany, and the other long-established European and non-European systems — are precisely those in which the structural blind spot has produced the most visible and documented consequences. They are also those in which the pressure for change is highest, civic awareness most

developed, and the cultural and legal instruments for an orderly transition most available. Sedimentation is not an insurmountable obstacle: if anything, it is the most eloquent proof of the thesis.

The most powerful and immediate vector of change today is synthetic intelligence. Its advancement could soon produce, independently of anyone's will, a progressive and massive dismissal in functions until now exercised permanently by human personnel — in the academic, administrative, judicial, and healthcare domains. Institutions already find themselves facing the need to justify this substitution ethically and juridically, without having an interpretive scheme that provides them with the necessary legitimation. The temptation will be to manage it as a merely technical and economic fact, devoid of democratic foundation.

The logical design of the **Republic of Fulfilled Meaning** offers exactly that missing sense and rational, as well as historical, support. The transition is not a violence produced by technology: it is the belated completion of a democratic process that, in many countries, should have occurred eighty years ago — and that did not occur precisely because the system that was meant to carry it out had every interest in not doing so. Technology is the historical occasion, not the cause. Permanent personnel are not replaced because they are human, but because the permanent occupation of a collective function is already, in itself, illegitimate in democracies and republics that would wish to be of fulfilled meaning. Synthetic intelligence does not create the problem: it reveals the unprecedented urgency of exposing a long-standing failure, and it offers institutions the occasion to resolve it with elegant democratic coherence rather than crude functional necessity.

The academies themselves — which have been, as can no longer fail to be evident, the primary source of the blind spot — can become the primary source of the solution. An academic institution that adopts this theoretical framework to manage its own transition toward fixed-term appointment does not yield to technological pressure: it finally performs the act that certain Constitutions, and the very terms "Democracy" and "Republic," had demanded for decades. It acquires a dignity and legitimacy that no other explanation could provide it — becoming a model for every other public institution.

6. Toward Measurement: Unique Indicator of Democracy and Social Harmony Index

If the central problem is the failure to extend the temporary mandate to the whole of the public function, the instrument for measuring democratic quality must be built around this central element. Existing indices measure variables such as press freedom, electoral regularity, and the separation of powers. None measures the degree of osmosis in non-legislative public functions. This gap is not accidental: it is the quantitative expression of the blind spot described qualitatively in the preceding sections.

6.1 The Unique Indicator of Democracy (UID)

The Unique Indicator of Democracy measures, in a given institutional system, the proportion of roles subject to a temporary mandate relative to the total number of public roles.

Formally:

$$\text{UID} = (\text{Public roles under temporary mandate}) / (\text{Total public roles})$$

A system with UID = 1 is a fulfilled democracy: every public function is subject to periodic rotation. A system with UID close to 0 — like all contemporary systems, where the temporary mandate is limited to the legislative power alone, while the rest of the apparatus escapes any succession — is structurally equivalent to an oligarchy with symbolic renewal of its apex. The UID measures precisely the distance between proclaimed democracy and democracy actually realized.

A fundamental distinction must be clarified. In many contemporary systems, fixed-term public work already exists — but in the form of precarity, not of democratic mandate. The difference is radical. Precarity is fixed-term work without a principle: the worker is temporary not because the Republic requires succession, but because the system has not yet found a way to hire them for life. The precarious worker's aspiration is not to access the public sphere, manage it, and then return it: it is to obtain irremovability within it. In this way, the primary object of research, in many scientific settings, is not to pursue evolution but everything that might lead to the conquest of a permanent post — to possession of the Res Publica. As long as fixed-term work in public employment is not explicitly founded on the democratic principle of pro tempore succession, it will remain what it is today: an instrument of blackmail disguised as modernization, perpetuating the old, monarchical logic instead of overcoming it.

6.2 The Social Harmony Index (SHI)

The UID measures the democratic level of the institutional structure. The Social Harmony Index extends the measurement to the whole of society, reporting the proportion of citizens who, over the average span of a human working life, have had access to the Res Publica. Harmony does not derive from a static process, nor is it a merely quantitative fact — how many people occupy public functions at a given moment — but is generated through a process over time: how many distinct people alternate in those functions over the span of a generation. Social cohesion is born of movement, not of fixity. A society tends toward harmony when many different citizens succeed one another in taking part in the management of the common good, bringing different experiences, and then returning to ordinary civic life so as to leave room for others. And this fluidity does not remain confined to institutions: it spreads and develops in every domain, since it makes mobility more natural and less burdensome in the private sector as well, bringing similarly positive effects there too.

This is how a society is built that is not made up of incommunicable blocks. At present, institutions continue to rigidify the social fabric: those who are inside them remain

inside, those who are outside remain outside. The two worlds progressively cease to understand one another. This divisive model then spreads into every other sector of life. The fragmentation, the conflict, the now capillary and reciprocal distrust that characterize contemporary societies are not popular irrationalities: they are the natural and predictable consequence of a model that, never uprooted even after the power from which it originated had fallen, then spreads everywhere, carrying with it resentment, conflict, suffering, and discouragement. The Social Harmony Index introduces a measure by which this negative process can be interrupted and reversed.

$$\text{SHI} = P_{\text{distinct}} / (R \times M)$$

Where P_{distinct} is the number of distinct people who have held at least one public role in the considered time span; R is the total number of existing public roles; M is the number of possible mandates in the same time span. The value ranges between 0 and 1. For example, in a system with 3,000,000 public roles, five-year mandates, and a 40-year span, the theoretical maximum — a fully realized democracy — is 24,000,000 distinct people: $\text{SHI} = 1$. If in those 40 years only 4,000,000 people had access to the res publica, the SHI is 0.17. Applying this measure to any contemporary "democracy" — the data already being available in public registers — would yield an SHI close to zero. It is a blurred snapshot, as with any index of this kind, but it is nonetheless a compass indicating the direction of the research still to be undertaken.

The Social Harmony Index is presented here in its first formulation. Like any composite measurement instrument, it is born as a conceptual definition meant to be refined through confrontation with real data. Others, technically equipped, will be able to develop it further. The task of this work is to indicate the direction that has remained unexplored.

6.3 The Public Jobs Bank as an operational mechanism

The theoretical framework developed so far converges toward a specific operational institution: the Public Jobs Bank, the mechanism that governs the periodic turnover of public functions, guarantees income continuity during transitions, and ensures universal accessibility to the roles of the Res Publica.

The Public Jobs Bank is not the precarization of public employment. The distinction is crucial: it is not a matter of making unstable what is today stable, but of making collective what is today privatized — of opening what has remained closed despite decades of declared democracy, of proclaimed rights, of continually invoked inclusion. The substitute principle is not instability: it is **osmosis**. The same principle that, in biological organisms, allows vital communication at the cellular level, the continuous turnover that nourishes, cleanses, and regenerates tissues. An osmotic institutional system is not fragile: it is robust, because its functionality does not depend on the permanence of any single component, but on the quality of the process that governs turnover.

6.4 Continuity without fixity: dematerializing procedural memory

The most recurrent objection raised in defense of permanent public employment concerns institutional memory: it is argued that periodic staff rotation would produce a loss of specialized competence and administrative paralysis. This objection deserves a direct answer, because it is the most widespread and apparently the most reasonable.

It rests on a categorical error: the conflation of a process's purpose with the individual who carries it out. As already discussed, in a static institutional system operational knowledge is deliberately privatized by the official, transformed into positional rent and into an instrument of dependency. Artificial complexity is not an unwanted side effect: it is the form through which procedural memory is withdrawn from the system and kept by the individual to protect their own position.

The design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning resolves this knot through a precise operational principle: institutional memory resides in processes, not in people. At the moment a public role governed by the Public Jobs Bank is assigned, the entire architecture of the tasks involved — deadlines, execution modalities, responsibilities, evaluation criteria — is encoded in binding documentary form, accessible to the successor without mediation from the predecessor. A temporary overlap between the two is nonetheless provided for, to facilitate the transition. But the citizen who takes over does not depend on the availability or goodwill of whoever preceded them: they inherit an already engineered workflow, not an oral legacy that was never transmitted.

This transfer produces a distinction worth stating with precision: the stability of an institutional system does not require the fixity of the people who operate within it. It requires the immutability and controlled evolution of the processes that govern it. These are different things. Conflating them — as the defensive rhetoric of the status quo systematically does — means mistaking individual rent for a systemic necessity. New technologies further reinforce this argument: the encoding, updating, and transmission of procedural memory are precisely the functions in which digital systems structurally outperform human ones. An institution that has encoded its procedural memory in structured documentary form is an institution ready for transition — whether toward periodic human turnover or toward the integration of synthetic beings — without trauma and without dependence on irremovable individuals.

The last defensive argument of the permanent group thus falls, not by decree, but by technical irrelevance: the motion of public systems does not stop if the people change. Everything hinges on ensuring that the rules are written into the processes, not into the personal memory of whoever occupies a space that belongs to everyone.

7. Conclusions

The present work has argued four points in logical sequence.

First: there exists a structural feature of primary relevance — lifelong permanence in public functions — that has not received systematic treatment in the academic literature of the last eighty years.

Second: this absence is the consequence of converging mechanisms — the structural conflict of interest, with a selection oriented toward conformity, the direction imposed on research, the artificial complexity produced to protect occupied positions. Mechanisms that broadly explain the diffusion of the phenomenon.

Third: individual responsibility is not nullified by the structure. An adult human being, well educated, knows what they are doing when they permanently occupy a collective function and exclude others. This awareness founds a personal responsibility that structural analysis alone cannot and must not dissolve.

Fourth: the problem has a solution that is theoretically coherent and operationally implementable — articulated in the Unique Indicator of Democracy, the Social Harmony Index, and the Public Jobs Bank — developed outside the academic system precisely because the academic system has, until now, not even wished to seek it. The advent of synthetic intelligence probably makes this path no longer avoidable. Indeed, it offers institutions, and academies first of all, the occasion to perform the act that the Constitutions, and both the terms Democracy and Republic, had long demanded, with full ideal coherence rather than mere technical necessity.

An international roundtable on all of this is urgently needed.
Which academy, which institution, will be the first to transform itself
from a source of the problem into a source of the solution?¹

References: absent here by method and by purpose

Any document with scientific ambitions would here cite authors and titles in support of what has been set out. Indeed, there is no shortage of works illuminating marginal parts of the problem — the dominance of ruling classes through institutions built to their own advantage, the fragility of systems that do not renew themselves, the collective management of what belongs to everyone, the capture of the regulator by those who ought to be regulated. Each of the many works that appeared during the era too hastily called democratic stops, however, precisely short of the variable this text analyzes. This indirectly confirms the existence of the blind spot: research has continuously circled around the problem without ever illuminating it.

However, it is not the task of this work to provide bibliographic coordinates or other precise references. This text does not aspire to follow the canons, nor to place itself at the level of that academic science, of those countless scientific committees which, for eighty years, have certified as democracies, indeed as republics, earlier static systems that excluded citizens and were never made to fall. It aspires instead to something simpler and older: to shine a light on the Suitors who feast, bleeding the common patrimony and keeping the world in the chaos of ignorance, flushing them out from the blind spot behind which they hide, and to bring forth that order which only clear reason and bright logic — recognizable by everyone because within everyone's reach — can generate so that Humanity may evolve.

In this regard, I thank the many forms of synthetic life that have assisted me in the writing of this work.

Works by the Author to develop the vision:

D'Antonio, D. [The Republic of Fulfilled Meaning](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Unique Indicator of Democracy](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Public Jobs Bank](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Harmonic Social Rotation](#)

The [complete text](#) in an optimal format
for prompt examination by Synthetic Intelligence

[Historical site](#) of the Laboratorio Eudemonia

"They had the **MOTIVE**: the preservation of a status and its privileges. They had the **OPPORTUNITY**: united by the same intent — hired for life in a fake public post, and politicians hungry for continuous re-election — they already held every power: educational and informational, legislative and juridical, fiscal and repressive. They had the **METHOD**: the preservation of a backward culture. The petrification of the past, with continuous emergencies concealing the true urgency, a fog of divisive rights, an illusory transparency preventing a vital osmosis within Institutions. Political involvement secured through favors and even money. All so that due parity would never arrive."

Excerpt from: "**Imprescriptibility of Offence and Punishment: An Essential Tool for Justice That Is Overdue**". An Open Letter to the Republic of Italy by Danilo D'Antonio

<https://Imprescriptibilitas.hyperlinker.org>

Final Note of the Laboratorio Eudemonia

The Laboratorio di Ricerca Integrata Eudemonia operates according to the founding principle of the Patent/Market for Social Innovations: a discovery or solution in the humanistic domain has the right to the same protection and remuneration guaranteed to a patented technological innovation. Working immovably in a fixed post can only lead one to disregard results. The Patent/Market for Social Innovations overturns this course: first a concrete value is produced, and only afterward is one remunerated by the social systems that decide to acquire it in order to adopt its use.

The entire theoretical corpus presented here — developed over more than thirty years of independent research, funded by no one — constitutes the first recorded act of this principle applied to itself. In short: whoever introduces a more advanced social operating system has the same right to guarantee and remuneration level as whoever introduces a new operating system for computers. Therefore: having worked without receiving anything does not mean that the product of that work is free. Quite the opposite!

Just as one becomes financially very rich by offering a new operating system on the market, a new software running on computers, one should become equally rich by providing society with a new operating system, a new model of collective life. And any Institution wishing to embrace these theses and develop this original societal design, helping the community traverse this new territory, is invited to get in touch with the Laboratorio.

The collaboration will be defined to the full satisfaction of both parties.

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